Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must "get both sides of the market on board ". Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is to how they court each side while making money overall. The paper builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and enduser surplus for different governance structures (profit-maximizing platforms and not-for-profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner.
Introduction
Buyers of videogame consoles want games to play on; game developers pick platforms that are or will be popular among gamers. Cardholders value credit or debit card only to the extent that these are accepted by the merchants they patronize; affiliated merchants benefit from a widespread diffusion of cards among consumers. More generally, many if not most markets with network externalities are characterized by the presence of two distinct sides whose ultimate benefit stems from interacting through a common platform.
Platform owners or sponsors in these industries must address the celebrated "chickenand-egg problem" and be careful to "get both sides on board". Despite much theoretical progress made in the last two decades on the economics of network externalities and widespread strategy discussions of the chicken-and-egg problem, two-sided markets have received scant attention. The purpose of this paper is to start filling this gap.
The recognition that many markets are multi-sided leads to new and interesting, positive and normative questions. Under multi-sidedness, platforms must choose a price structure and not only a price level for their service. For example, videogame platforms such as Sony, Sega and Nintendo make money on game developers through per-unit royalties on games and fixed fees for development kits and treat the gamers side as a loss leader.
Interestingly, operating system platforms for the PC and handheld devices have adopted the opposite business model and aim at making money on consumers. The choice of a business model seems to be key to the success of a platform and receives much corporate attention. Table 1 provides a few illustrations 1 of the two-sided markets and shows that platforms often treat one side as a profit center and the other as a loss leader, or, at best, as financially neutral. A number of these illustrations are discussed in "mini-case studies" in section 7. And Table 2 lists a few important segments of the new economy that will be searching for a proper business model in the next few years. Such conventional wisdom about business models found in the trade press and summarized in Table 1 is of course subject to criticism. To reason in terms of profit centers, costs are often "intuitively," but 1 There are of course other illustrations, for example scientific journals, that must match readers and authors. Interestingly, the Bell Journal of Economics for a number of years after it was launched was sent for free to anyone who requested it. There is currently much discussion of how the business model for scientific journals will evolve with electronic publishing. The list of social gatherings examples of cross-subsidization could be extended to include dating or marital agencies which may charge only one side of the market.
A couple of explanations regarding markets that will not be discussed in section 7: Social gatherings: celebrities often do not pay or are paid to come to social happenings as they attract other participants (who may then be charged an hefty fee); similarly, in some conferences, star speakers are paid while others pay. Real estate: In many countries buyers are not charged for visiting real estate properties and thus marginal visits are heavily subsidized. To be certain, the sale price reflects the real estate agency fee, but this does not imply that the arrangement is neutral (see section 8). Shopping malls: shoppers are subsidized. They don't pay for parking; in France they can also buy gasoline at a substantial discount. Discount coupon books: These are given away to consumers. Intermediaries charge merchants for the service. Browsers: The picture given in Table 1 is a bit simplistic. In particular, Netscape initially made about one third of its revenue on the client side before giving the software away. But Netscape always viewed the software running on top of the operating system on the web servers as a major source of profit.
arbitrarily allocated to either side of the market. Yet, the conventional wisdom points at some more fundamental logic related to prices and surpluses on both sides of the market.
A major objective of our paper is to unveil this logic and the determinants of the choice of a business model. 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF EXISTING BUSINESS MODELS

Table 2: prospective applications
From both a positive and a normative viewpoints, two-sided markets differ from the textbook treatment of multiproduct oligopoly or monopoly. The interaction between the two sides gives rise to strong complementarities, but the corresponding externalities are not internalized by end users, unlike in the multiproduct literature (the same consumer buys the razor and the razor blade). In this sense, our theory is a cross between network economics, which emphasizes such externalities, and the literature on (monopoly or competitive) multiproduct pricing, which stresses cross-elasticities. For example, socially optimal "Ramsey" prices are not driven solely by superelasticity formulae but also reflect each side's contribution to the other side's surplus.
Some new questions raised by two-sided markets are more specific to the existence of competition between platforms. In a number of markets, a fraction of end users on one or the two sides connect to several platforms. Using the Internet terminology, we will say that they multihome. For example, many merchants accept both American Express The paper studies how the price allocation between the two sides of the market is affected by a) platform governance (for-profit vs not-for-profit), b) end users' cost of multihoming, c) platform differentiation, d) platforms' ability to use volume-based pricing, e) the presence of same-side externalities, and f) platform compatibility. It also investigates how privately optimal pricing structures compare with socially optimal ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the simplest version of the model, in which end-users incur no fixed cost and platform pricing is linear on both sides of the market, and analyzes the (profit maximizer and Ramsey planner) monopoly benchmarks. Section 3 derives equilibrium behavior when two (for-profit or not-for-profit) platforms compete. Section 4 obtains some comparative statics in order to help predict the choice of business model. Section 5 compares the price structures in the case of linear demands. Section 6 generalizes the model and results in order to allow for fixed user costs and nonlinear platform pricing. Section 7 summarizes the main results and provides seven "mini case studies" to illustrate how our theory may shed light on existing and future business models. Last, Section 8 concludes with some general considerations about two-sided markets.
As we discussed, our work puts network economics and multiproduct pricing together.
From the early work of Rohlfs (1974) to the recent theoretical advances and applications to antitrust through the pioneering work of Katz-Shapiro (1985 ) and Farrell-Saloner (1985 , a large body of literature has developed on network industries. To make progress, however, this literature has ignored multisidedness and the price allocation question. In contrast, the competitive multiproduct pricing literature (e.g., Baumol et al 1982,
Wilson 1993) has carefully described the interdependency of pricing decisions but it has
In industries in which platforms do not charge per-end-user-transaction fees, steering is more subtle as it operates through effort substitution. For example, a software platform offering better software development kits, support, and application programming interfaces not only encourages the development of applications optimized to this platform, but is also likely to induce application developers to devote less attention to rival platforms. A portal or TV network's cut in advertising rates induces advertisers to advertise more on their medium and to substitute away from other media. A shopping mall's cut in rental prices or improved layout may induce a shop to increase its size or appeal and lead the latter to neglect or abandon its outlets in rival shopping malls. And so forth.
not considered the affiliation externalities that lie at the core of the network economics literature. In contrast with the buyer of a razor, who internalizes the impact of his purchase on the demand and surplus attached to razor blades, our end-users do not internalize the impact of their purchase on the other side of the market.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent theoretical literature on chicken-andegg problems. This literature however assumes either that there is a monopoly platform pricing in a situation in which the demand for one good depends (linearly) on its price and on the quantity of the other good sold. They characterize the price structure as a function of the network externality coefficients. They then look at the incentive of a producer of a good to enter a (complementary or substitute) market with another incumbent producer.
With complements, entry losses may be profitable because entry puts pressure on price and boosts the profit of the core business. Caillaud and Jullien (2001) study competition among intermediaries. In their model, platforms act as matchmakers and can use sophisticated pricing (registration fees, and possibly transaction fees provided the intermediaries observe transactions). Indeed, one of their contributions is to show that dominant firms are better off charging transactions rather than registrations when deterring entry. They also show that competition is more intense when platforms cannot deter multihoming.
Their contribution is complementary to ours. For example, it assumes homogeneous populations on either side, and thus abstracts from the elasticity-related issues studied in our paper. Last, in a model related to that of Caillaud-Jullien, Jullien (2001) shows that an entrant represents a much stronger competitive threat on an incumbent platform when third-degree price discrimination is feasible. The ability to "divide and conquer" forces profit down, so much so that the incumbent may prefer platform compatibility.
Monopoly platform benchmark
The two-sided markets described heretofore differ is some respects, and we therefore should not aim at capturing all specificities of all industries. Our strategy will be to include a number of key ingredients common to our illustrations in a basic model, and then to generalize our analysis in order to extend its relevance to various two-sided markets. For the moment, we assume that end users incur no fixed usage cost and that platform pricing is linear. This basic model is a good representation of the credit card market; the reader may want to keep this in mind, although it will be clear that the insights have much broader generality. 
is independent of the number of sellers. Similarly, let
denote the sellers' demand for platform services.
We consider in turn the case of a private monopoly, and that of a public monopoly maximizing social welfare subject to budget balance.
Private monopoly
A private monopoly chooses selects prices so as to maximize total profit:
Assuming that D B and D S are log concave, it is easy to see that π is also log concave (jointly in (p B , p S )). Its maximum is characterized by the first-order conditions:
In particular:
This condition characterizes the values of p B and p S that maximize volume for a given total price p: The volume impact of a small (absolute) variation of prices has to be the same on both sides. If we introduce the elasticities of quasi-demands:
the private monopoly prices can be characterized by a two-sided formula that is reminiscent of Lerner's formula:
In fact, the total price p = p B + p S chosen by the private monopoly is given by the classical Lerner formula:
where η = η B + η S , the total volume elasticity, is assumed to exceed 1. What is new in formula (1) is the way in which this total price is allocated between the two sides of the market:
and 
(ii) The price structure is given by the ratio of elasticities (and not inverse elasticities):
Ramsey pricing
We consider now the case of a Ramsey monopolist maximizing welfare subject to budget balance, and derive the Ramsey formulae in our context 5 . The net surpluses on each side for an average transaction are given by standard formulae:
Under budget balance, social welfare is highest when the sum of both sides' net surpluses:
is maximized subject to the constraint:
The first-order, "cost allocation" condition is:
This gives:
After simplification, we obtain a characterization of Ramsey prices: 
and
Condition (7) characterizes the price structure that maximizes social surplus for a given total price p. Returning to the formula yielding the private monopolist's price structure,
the additional terms in formula (7) 
Modeling
We now assume that two platforms compete for the markets (we will also look at the case in which both platforms are jointly owned, in order to compare the outcome under platform competition with those obtained in section 2 in the private monopoly and Ramsey cases).
End-users' benefits. As earlier, buyers and sellers are heterogenous: Their benefits from transacting vary across the two populations and are private information. if the two sides have at least one platform in common; that is, there exists at least one platform on which both are willing to trade. If both "multihome" (are affiliated with both platforms), the choice of platform is a priori indeterminate. In accordance with our illustrations, we introduce a slight asymmetry between the two sides of the market by assuming that, whenever a seller is affiliated with the two platforms, the buyer chooses the one on which the transaction takes place. Transaction volumes. The buyers' behavior generates "quasi-demand functions":
We assume that the distribution of (b
) is symmetric, which implies that demand functions are also symmetric:
When prices are equal p
we will use the simplified notation:
We focus for the moment on symmetric prices: p
seller of type b S affiliates with both platforms when b S ≥ p S and none otherwise. The transaction volumes on each platform are thus equal to
The sellers' net surplus is, as earlier,
while the buyers' net surplus is
Joint ownership benchmarks. The private monopoly and Ramsey benchmarks studied in section 2 correspond to the situation in which both platforms are under joint ownership and charge identical prices. For instance,
where
Governance. We assume that the two platforms are controlled by competing entities, either profit-maximizing firms (section 3.3) or not-for-profit associations (section 3.4).
Important examples of such associations can be found in the payment card industry (Visa and MasterCard). In such associations, prices for buyers and sellers are determined by competition (both intra and inter platforms) on downstream markets (issuing banks on the buyers' side, and acquirers on the sellers' side).
Transaction volumes for asymmetric prices
In order to analyze competition, we need to determine transaction volumes on each platform for arbitrary prices, thus extending formula (11) 
). The seller chooses to multihome when b S is large enough, more precisely when
We can now summarize sellers' optimal decisions:
8 Affiliation with platform 2 only is clearly dominated.
• sellers with low types (b
• sellers with high types (b S ≥b 12 ) trade on both platforms, Let us denote by σ i (i = 1, 2) the following indices:
Given property ( 
Starting from a symmetric price structure, suppose platform 1 decreases p S 1 by a small amount ε. This increases demand for platform 1 in two ways: The platform attracts new
) and "steers" former multihoming merchants (p
Given that
, the effectiveness of steering depends on σ 2 : it is nil when σ 2 = 1 and infinite when σ 2 = 0.
We are now in a position to determine the volume of transactions on each platform as a function of prices p B i and p S i . We restrict ourselves to the case p
is obtained by symmetry). Let us denote by D S the sellers' "quasi-demand function":
From the affiliation decisions derived above, a proportion D S (b 12 ) of sellers multihome,
) are affiliated only with platform 1. Assuming that the probability of a meeting between a buyer and a seller is independent of their types, the total expected volumes of transactions on the platforms are:
for platform 1, and:
for platform 2, whereb 12 is given by formula (12) . As already noticed, these formulae are
Competition between proprietary platforms
Proprietary platforms choose prices so as to maximize profit. Consider for example platform 1's profit:
As in the case of a monopolist, this maximization can be decomposed into the choice of a price level,
, and that of a price structure given a price level. The first-order conditions are:
The following analysis is complex, as it must handle a potential lack of smoothness of the objective function. It can be skipped in a first reading. The end result (Proposition 3) is remarkably simple, though.
Recall the expressions of volumes on both systems, when, say, p
We focus on symmetric equilibria (p
, for which volumes have simpler expressions:
While
the first derivative in formula (17) is not necessarily well defined since volumes have a different expression according to whether p
, and
Interestingly, Q 1 turns out to be differentiable. The left-and rightderivatives of Q 1 with respect to p
Moreover ∂b 12 ∂p
, and ∂b 21 ∂p
And so
Thus Q 1 is differentiable with respect to p S 1 and:
Using (21), (17) and (18) we obtain a simple form for the first-order condition for a symmetric equilibrium: ∂d
The first term on the left-hand side of this latter formula is the singlehoming index σ defined earlier, which measures the proportion of "unique customers". The second term is the ratio of the own-brand elasticity of demand for buyers
over the buyers' price p B . Finally, the last term is the ratio of the elasticity of sellers' demand over sellers' price. Thus we can state:
Proposition 3 : A symmetric equilibrium of the competition between proprietary platforms is characterized by:
The formulae are thus the same as in the monopoly platform case, except that a) on the buyer side, the demand elasticity η B is replaced by the (higher) own-brand elasticity η B o , and b) on the seller side, the demand elasticity η S is replaced by the equivalent of an own-brand elasticity η S /σ. When all buyers singlehome (σ = 1), the own-brand elasticity and the demand elasticity coincide. But as multihoming becomes more widespread (σ decreases), the possibility of steering increases the own-brand elasticity η S /σ.
Competition between associations
When platforms are run by not-for-profit cooperatives owned by members (operators on the buyer and seller sides), prices paid by the end users are set by the members and not by the platforms. Platforms however have an important say in the price structure, especially if competition among members is intense on both sides of the market. In our model, an association's only strategic decision is the choice of access charges between members. Neglecting platform costs, the zero-profit condition implies that these access "charges" exactly offset each other as one side receives the charge paid by the other side.
For example in the payment card industry the access charge is called the interchange fee and is paid by acquirers (the sellers' banks) to issuers (the buyers' banks). 9 This section studies the access charge chosen by competing associations and compares the corresponding prices for final users (buyers and sellers) with those resulting from competition between profit-maximizing systems. While the section is currently most relevant to the payment card industry, its potential applicability is much broader. For example, reflecting recent concerns about unequal access to B2B exchanges, some have suggested that these exchanges be run as non-profit associations. Furthermore, and as will be observed in section 7.2, networks of interconnected networks (e.g. communication networks) are economically similar to non-profit platforms.
The members compete on two downstream markets, the buyer and the seller down- 9 The determination of access charges within associations has so far only been studied in the context of the payment card industry and under the assumption of a monopoly platform (Rochet-Tirole (2000) , Schmalensee (2000) ).
stream markets. Given access charge a i on platform i, the net marginal costs for a member of platform i of serving a buyer and a seller, respectively, are 
This assumption is for example satisfied if (a) members belong to a single association and are differentiated in a direction orthogonal to that of platform differentiation; 10 and (b) members on a given platform are little differentiated. Intense intraplatform competition then results in Hotelling competition between members taking as given (as a first-order approximation) the number of end users on the platform (which is basically determined by the platforms' access charges given that the members' markups are small).
11
Under this simplifying assumption, the profits of all members of an association are proportional to the volume of transactions on the association's platform. The interests of all members are thus completely aligned. Regardless of its exact structure the association selects the access charge so as to maximize its volume. Furthermore the total price on each system is constant:
where m = m B + m S is the total margin on downstream markets and c = c B + c S .
Last, in order to be able to compare the association with the cases of a monopolist and of competing proprietary platforms, we must assume that the quasi-demand functions 10 Mathematically, in a generalized Hotelling framework, the "transportation cost" for an end-user when selecting a (platform, member) pair is the sum of the transportation cost to the platform and that to the member.
11 If members have dual membership instead (eg. they are both affiliated with Visa and MasterCard, or they provide support or write applications for two cooperatively designed operating systems or videogame platforms), then requirement (b) is unnecessary in that margins are constant even if member differentiation is not small relative to platform differentiation: See Hausman et al. (2001) . But one must then inquire into the associations' governance structure. Our treatment carries over as long as governance leads each association to maximize its volume.
are The first-order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium are given by
(condition on total price) and the equivalent of condition (5):
(same impact on volume of a marginal price increase on each side of the market).
The analysis of the price structure is therefore identical to that for proprietary platforms. The price level is lower for associations with healthy competition among their members but may exceed the proprietary platforms price level if double marginalization is strong.
Proposition 4 : A symmetric equilibrium of the competition between associations is
characterized by
Comparing now Proposition 2 and 4, we see that even when downstream markets are perfectly competitive (the margin m converges to zero) and so the price level is socially optimal, competition between not-for-profit associations need not generate an efficient outcome. Indeed, the condition for an efficient price structure (given in Proposition 2) is:
while the condition characterizing competition between associations is different:
This is natural, as (a) the associations do not internalize the end-users' surpluses, and 
Determinants of business model
Let θ be a parameter that affects the volume of transactions on the platforms. In this section, we consider the impact of a small variation in θ on user prices p B and p S , depending on industry structure (monopoly or duopoly) and on the platforms' governance structure (for-profits or associations). We concentrate on three important determinants of industry conduct and performance:
Marquee buyers: In the first application, θ represents a (small) uniform shift in sellers'
surpluses, due to the presence of marquee buyers on the other side of the market. As a result, the sellers' demand function becomes:
Installed bases/captive buyers:
In the second application, θ represents the (small) mass of buyers who are loyal to their platform, independently of prices. Such buyers, say, are tied by long-term contracts. As a result, the buyers' demand functions become:
Multihoming: In the third application, θ represents an exogenous increase in the singlehoming index of buyers. Assume for example that d
is Intuitively, marquee buyers make the platform more attractive for the sellers. The platform then raises its price p S to sellers, which reduces the de facto marginal cost, A regularity condition however is required here in the case of platform competition, which creates a countervailing steering effect: Each platform's buyer membership is then "more unique" to the platform, and so it is more costly for a seller to forgo the platform.
Last, an increase in multihoming makes steering more attractive and puts a downward pressure on the seller price.
12 This is for example the case in the Hotelling specification presented in Section 5, when the marginal transportation cost of buyers increases only for distances in the noncompetitive hinterland of the rival platform, so that d 
Linear demands
We 
Proposition 6 : Suppose that the buyers' quasi-demand is described by an Hotelling model, with uniform distribution and outside options with distance ∆ between the two platforms and distance δ between each platform and its nearest outside option, and that the market is not covered (not all potential buyers buy). (i) • The buyer singlehoming index is equal to:
and decreases when the platforms become more substitutable.
• The platforms' ability to steer (discourage through undercutting sellers from multihoming) decreases with the buyer singlehoming index.
• On the buyer side, total elasticity is equal to own-brand elasticity times the singlehoming index:
( 
ii) The price structure is the same under a monopoly platform, competing proprietary platforms and competing associations. It satisfies
p B η B = p S η S .
(iii) If furthermore seller demand is linear, then the price structure in the three environments is Ramsey optimal. (iv) The price vectors given in formulae (31) and (32) satisfy the second-order conditions for an equilibrium if and only if
Generalization to fixed user fees and usage costs
In many of the examples presented in the introduction, fixed costs, either fixed fees charged by the platforms or fixed usage costs, play an important role. In order to demonstrate the robustness of our results to the introduction of fixed costs, we now adapt our model accordingly. To simplify the analysis, we assume that buyers singlehome (for example, consumers read a single newspaper or connect to a single portal). Second, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium. There is a sizeable literature on tipping in the presence of user fixed costs and we have little to add to this literature. Last, we first look at the case in which there is no direct exchange of money between the two sides of the market, as is the case for advertising in newspaper, TV and portals; we will later show how to extend the analysis to cases, such as videogames, exhibiting direct monetary transactions between end-users. 
Platforms incur fixed costs
Similarly, a seller with average benefit b S of reaching a consumer and with fixed cost γ S of designing an ad for this newspaper has net utility:
The buyers are heterogenous over parameters (b The strategic choices for the platforms are the per "transaction" (eyeball viewing an ad) markups:
Assuming that readers buy a single newspaper, the number of copies sold by newspaper i is given by
which is equal to some function d 
These formulas are valid provided fixed costs for buyers are high enough so that no buyer buys the two newspapers (no multihoming for buyers). Substituting (24) 
Let us define the own -and cross-elasticities for buyer demand:
and η
.
On the seller side, we define the own-price elasticity and the network elasticity:
With this notation, the formulae for transaction volumes and platform profit look remarkably similar to the ones obtained earlier. Platform i maximizes:
Simple computations yield:
Proposition 7 : A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by prices (p B , p S ) satisfying:
While we simplified the model by assuming singlehoming (σ = 1), the presence of fixed costs implies that network externalities impact not only end-user surpluses, but also demands. For example, on the buyer side, the own price elasticity η B O is multiplied by a factor greater than 1 to account for the fact that when a platform reduces its buyer price, more buyers connect to the platform, inducing more sellers to connect and further increasing buyer demand. And similarly on the seller side.
In some more structured applications, the formulae in Proposition 7 simplify. For example, in the advertising example, it is reasonable to assume that sellers incur no fixed usage cost (γ S ≡ 0), since the advertising campaign has already been prepared for other media. In this case formula (24) 
Denoting again by p 
Summary and mini case studies
Let us now summarize the paper's key insights. The main contribution has been to derive simple formulas governing the price structure in two-sided markets, and this for a wide array of governance structures (private monopoly, Ramsey planner, competition between for-profit or non-profit platforms). But we also obtained more specific insights. On the public policy side:
1) The Ramsey price structure does not correspond to a "fair cost allocation". Rather, like private business models, it aims at getting both sides on board.
2) The main conceptual difference between private and Ramsey price structures is that the latter takes into account the average net surplus created on the other side of the market when attracting an end user on one side. Yet, private business models do not exhibit any obvious price structure bias (indeed, in the special case of linear demands, all private price structures are Ramsey optimal price structures).
On the business model front, we obtained:
3) Monopoly and competitive platforms design their price structure so as to get both sides on board.
4) An increase in multihoming on the buyer side facilitates steering on the seller side and results in a price structure more favorable to sellers.
5) The presence of marquee buyers (buyers generating a high surplus on the seller side) raises the seller price and (in the absence of price discrimination on the buyer side) lowers the buyer price.
6) Captive buyers tilt the price structure to the benefit of sellers.
We now develop seven "mini case studies" meant to emphasize the attention paid by platforms to the pricing structure. A rigorous validation of testable implications 3) through 6) lies beyond the scope of this paper, and we hope that future research will perform the econometric studies needed to confirm or infirm these hypotheses in specific industries. We only offer some casual empiricism; this preliminary evidence seems quite encouraging for the theory.
Credit and debit cards
The payment industry offers a nice illustration of implications 3) through 6). Historically, the business model for credit and differed debit cards has been to attract cardholders and induce them to use their cards. Visa and MasterCard are not-for-profit associations owned by over 6,000 bank (and nonbank) members. The associations centrally set interchange fees to be paid by acquirers (the merchants' banks) to issuers (the cardholders' banks).
These interchange fees are proportional to transaction volume. A higher interchange fee is, via the competition among issuers, partly or fully passed through to consumers in the form of lower card fees and higher card benefits, which encourages card ownership and usage;
and, via the competition among acquirers, partly or fully passed through to merchants, who pay a higher merchant discount (the percentage of the sale price that the merchant must pay the acquirer), which discourages merchant acceptance. The associations' choice of interchange fees have typically favored cardholders over merchants who kept accepting the card despite the high level of the merchant discounts (implication 3).
13
American Express, a for-profit closed system, works on the same business model, with an even higher degree of cross-subsidization. Traditionally, it has charged a much higher merchant discount. 14 It could afford to do so because the Amex clientele -in particular the corporate card clientele-was perceived as very attractive by merchants (hypothesis 13 Looking forward, it is likely that merchant card acceptance will become more elastic with the (ongoing) advent of on-line debit and the (future) introduction of Webplatforms.
14 And thus implicitly a much higher "interchange fee". For Amex, the interchange fee is only implicit, since the company is vertically integrated and performs the three roles of issuer, system and acquirer.
5). The gap between Amex's and the associations' merchant discounts has narrowed in the 1990s as more and more Amex customers got also a Visa card or MasterCard. Such "multihoming" by a fraction of cardholders made it less costly for merchants to turn down Amex cards (implication 4).
The on-line debit card market in the US has adopted an entirely different business model. Rather than courting consumers, it has wooed merchants through a low interchange fee. One key difference with credit and differed debit cards is that consumers indeed do not need to be courted (they already have in their pocket an ATM card, that they can use as an on-line debit card; so in a sense they are "captive"), while merchants, to perform on-line debit, must install costly pinpads (which most of them have not yet done). 15 This emphasizes the relevance of hypotheses 3) and 6).
Internet
In the Internet, the instrument of cross-subsidization is the termination or settlement charge (or lack thereof) between backbones. The termination charge for off-net traffic between two backbones is, as its name indicates, the price paid by the originating backbone to the terminating backbone for terminating the traffic handed over. It can be shown 16 that it is optimal to charge the "off-net cost" to end users for marginal incoming and outgoing traffic. That is, backbones should charge as if the traffic were off net, even though a fraction of the traffic is actually on net. The charge for incoming (outgoing) traffic decreases (increases) one-for-one with the termination charge. This implies that a high termination charge is indirectly borne by end users, like websites, whose volume of outgoing traffic far exceeds the volume of incoming traffic, and benefits end users, such as dial-up customers, who mostly receive traffic (downloads).
An internet in which backbones exchange traffic at a uniform volume-proportional termination charge is similar to the case of a single not-for-profit platform. This analogy can 15 The on-line offerings were first made by regional ATM networks. A number of these networks have now been consolidated and converted into a for-profit platform (Concord ESF). be best depicted by envisioning backbones exchanging traffic at public peering points.
17
An "association" running these public peering points and keeping track of bilateral termination charges would be similar to a credit-card association recording traffic between acquirers and issuers, with the termination charge the counterpart of the interchange fee.
A network of interconnected networks therefore resembles a single non-profit platform.
The Internet is still mostly run by pre-deregulation legacy arrangements, according to which the backbones charge nothing to each other for terminating traffic. This business model is currently being reexamined and it is quite possible that, as is the case for regular telephony, positive termination charges will be levied in the future. The legacy arrangements may well have made sense in an epoch in which the posting of content on the Web had to be encouraged. A key question now is whether a change in industry conditions motivates a move toward paying settlements.
Portals and media
The business model of (non-pay) TV and to a large extent newspapers has been to use viewers and readers as a loss leader, who attract advertizers. This business model has been adopted with a vengeance by Internet portals, which have supplied cheap or free
Internet access as well as free content (share quotes, news, e-mail, etc....) to consumers.
The profit center has been advertising revenue, including both fixed charges for banner placement and proportional referral fees.
18
Interestingly the portal industry is considering whether to stick to this business model or move to for-fee content. For example, Yahoo! is now starting to charge fees for services such as real-time share-quote services or auction services. A number of content sites have appeared that charge substantial fees for on-line content. 
Videogames
Our last four case studies are drawn from the software industry. The videogame market is a typical two-sided one. A platform cannot sell the console without games to play on and cannot attract game developers without the prospect of an installed base of consumers. In its thirty years of existence, the video game industry has had four leading platforms, Atari, Nintendo and Sega, and finally Sony. The business model that has emerged uses consoles as the loss leader and draws platform profit from applications development. To be certain, history has repeatedly shown that technically impressive platforms (e.g., Mattel in 1981, Panasonic in 1993, and Sega in 1985 and after 1995) fail when few quality games are written for them. But attracting game developers is only a necessary condition. In fact, the business model currently employed by Nintendo, Sega and Sony is to charge software developers a fixed fee together with a per-unit royalty on the games they produce. Although the industry's business model involves drawing revenue from developers, platforms can only go so far in taxing the latter. A key factor in Sony's PlayStation's victory over the Sega Saturn and Nintendo 64 was that Sony offered a development platform and software application that was much cheaper (about $10,000 par seat) and much easier to use (as it was PC based) than it two rivals'.
22
20 Initially, Nintendo placed a chip in its console. The console would not work unless an authenticating chip was present in the game cartridge. Encryption techniques allow platform manufacturers to meter game sales. 21 In September 2000, 157 developers were working on Xbox games. The Xbox is launched with 26 games. Interestingly, Electronic Arts (the maker of Fifa, SimCity and James Bond) was able to impose special conditions on Microsoft.
22 See Cringely (2001) for more detail. Sony sold its console below cost and made the money back on game royalties.
Streaming-media technology
Streaming-media platforms incorporate encoding, compression, scripting and delivery technologies to allow the delivery of streaming content, facilitate content creation and permit interactivity; for example, it is central to conferencing and Webcast. The current competition is among the RealNetworks, Microsoft and Apple platforms.
The streaming-media industry is still in its infancy and it is probably too early to point at "the" business model. The current business mostly, but not exclusively, subsidizes the client side. RealNetworks and Apple offer two clients, a basic, free client and a better, non-free one. RealNetworks, the current leader charges significant amounts on the server side for RealServer Plus and its upgrades. Apple in contrast is currently free on the server side, but has the disadvantage on running only on Macs. Microsoft's Windows Media is free (bundled with the operating systems).
Operating systems
Both sides in the Microsoft browser case agreed that a key competitive advantage of Windows over competing operating systems is its large installed base of applications.
Windows' business model is basically the opposite of that of videogame platforms. Windows makes money on users and as a first approximation does not make or loses money on applications developers.
23 It fixes the Applications Programming Interfaces 3 or 4 years in advance (a costly strategy) and invests heavily in developer support. This strategy proved profitable in its contest with Apple and IBM's OS/2. Apple has no integrated developers system tools allowing developers to test their programs; the latter had to buy 23 We are unaware of "hard data" on this and just report the industry's conventional wisdom. Nor do we have any hard data for handheld computer operating systems. Handheld computers operating systems, dominated by Palm's platform (75% market share in the US) and Microsoft's Pocket PC software, have adopted a business model that is similar to Windows for PC operating systems. Palm and Microsoft apparently charge about 10% of the hardware's wholesale price ($5 to $15) to hardware manufacturers. Both provide standard user interfaces and central support and development tools for developers of third-party software. For more detail, see http://www5.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2714210,00.html? chkpt-zdhpnews01.
an IBM workstation and a compiler. IBM viewed developer kits as a profit center.
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While other factors undoubtedly played a role in the competition among the three platforms, observers usually agree that Microsoft's choice of business model helped Windows establish dominance.
Text processing
A key issue confronting purchasers of text processing software is whether they will be able to "communicate" with people who don't make the same choice. Commercial software vendors have in this respect converged on the following business model: They offer a downgraded version of the paying software as "freeware". This free version allows "nonusers" to open, view and print, but not edit documents prepared with the paying software, and copy information from those documents to other applications. Examples of such free viewers are Word Viewer, PDF Viewer, and Scientific Viewer. Yet thinking of the markets discussed in this paper as one-sided markets just runs counter to evidence. First, the platform owners in all these industries devote much attention to their price-allocation business model: Is it more important to woo one side or the other? The quest for "getting both sides on board" makes no sense in a world in which only the total price for the end user interaction, and not its decomposition, matters. And the trade press would not contain so many descriptions of "chicken-and-egg" problems.
Second, the end users themselves are also very sensitive to the allocation of cost between them, indicating that some actual redistribution is taking place. Merchants vocally object to increases in interchange fees, and website operators will do so if settlement charges are introduced in the Internet. End users would not react in this way if charges were passed through. There are three broad reasons why neutrality does not hold in practice: a) Transaction costs. "Transaction costs" refer to a broad range of frictions that make it costly for one side of the market to pass through a redistribution of charges to the other side. Often, these transaction costs are associated with small stakes for individual transactions (which can become substantial when applied to a large number of transactions). The cost of thinking about including the pass-through, writing it into a contract, advertizing it to the other side and enforcing the covenant may then be prohibitive. For example, contractual relationships between a supplier, a buyer and their banks may not specify on which payment system the settlement of the transaction will occur.
A second type of transaction cost has to do with the absence of a low-cost billing system. Suppose that an academic downloads a PDF file of another academic's paper.
The micropayments that would be required for pass-through would probably require a costly third-party billing system to be developed cooperatively by Internet backbones and service providers.
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A third transaction cost is the impossibility of monitoring and recording the actual transaction or interaction. In the portal and media example, neutrality would imply that when the platform (portal, TV network, newspaper) raises the price of advertizing, this price increase translates into a smaller amount of money given by the advertizer to the consumer for "listening to the ad". But "listening" is not easily measurable (except for the monitoring of clicks in the Internet, and even then it is impossible to measure whether the consumer pays genuine attention 29 ). In practice therefore, the viewer/reader receives no compensation from the advertizer and neutrality does not obtain. The portal-and-media and real estate example offers another illustration of this phenomenon. The advertizing cost of locating a potential buyer ought to be treated by the seller as a sunk cost when choosing the price to offer to the potentially interested buyer.
c) Platform-determined constraints on pass-through. The platform may also take steps that limit the extent of pass-through. A case in point is the no-discrimination-rule adopted by credit card associations (Visa, MasterCard) and for-profits (Amex). 31 Merchants do not pass the merchant discount through only to cardholders. So there is only a partial passthrough between the two sides.
These reasons, which have been embodied in our model, explain why markets with network externalities are predominantly two-sided markets.
30 Similarly, end users seem to be averse to being "nickelled and dimed" by Internet portals (perhaps because they have a hard time thinking through the total amounts at stake) and flat fees are still quite popular in that industry. 31 In the US, the associations' no-discrimination-rule takes a weaker form. Namely, merchants are not allowed to impose surcharges on card payments; but they can offer discounts for cash purchases! That very few do is an interesting fact, that is probably related to the transaction costs category. In RochetTirole (2000), we abstract from such transaction costs and show that the level of the interchange fee is irrelevant if the no-discrimination rule is lifted.
APPENDIX Proof of Proposition 5 (i) Monopoly. Total volume is given by
We assume that D B and D S are (strictly) log concave with respect to prices, so that the first-order conditions are sufficient for the maximization of volume under a constant margin (case of an association) and for the maximization of profit (case of a for-profit monopoly). (i1) Monopoly association. The buyer price p B induced by an association is characterized by 
Thus dp B dθ is negative. Captive buyers:
And so dp B dθ is positive. (i2) For-profit monopoly. The maximum of the (log) profit is characterized by two conditions:
Denoting by ϕ(p, θ)the (vector) function on the left-hand side, we can apply the implicit function theorem (this time in R 2 ) given that the Jacobian Dϕ Dp is nonsingular (by the concavity of log π). Thus we obtain: dp dθ = − Dϕ Dp
where Dϕ Dp
Marquee buyers:
. Thus dp B dθ < 0 and dp S dθ > 0. Captive buyers:
= 0, and so: dp B dθ dp
Thus dp B dθ > 0 and dp S dθ < 0.
(ii) Competing associations. In the case of associations, for which the equilibrium buyer price is characterized by:
is the "own-price sensitivity" of buyer demand and
θ) .
In order to determine the monotonicity properties of p B with respect to θ, we apply the implicit function theorem to the left-hand side of the above equation:
However we need additional assumptions to ensure that ∂ψ ∂p B > 0, so that p B (θ) is indeed (locally) unique and differentiable, for two reasons:
• Possible nonexistence of equilibrium, due to the fact that the volume on system i is not necessarily quasiconcave with respect to (p • The possible presence of strategic complementarities that may generate a multiplicity of equilibria. We will assume away these difficulties and postulate that 
Captive buyers:
An increase in the number of captive buyers has two opposite effects. First, and as in the monopoly case, the captive customers reduce the elasticity of buyer demand, calling for a higher buyer price. Second, captive customers make steering more attractive, which pushes toward a higher seller price. The first effect dominates the second.
(iii) Increase in singlehoming. Again, we focus on competing associations. The buyer price at equilibrium is determined by:
By the same reasoning as above,
> 0 implies ∂ψ ∂θ > 0 and dp B dθ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
(a) Price structure.
, the quasi-demands are given by:
32 This regularity condition is satisfied when • x 1 is indifferent between 1 and 1 : p
2 , which gives: and sob 12 does not depend on p B . Furthermore, steering is particularly powerful (in that undercutting induces many sellers to stop multihoming) when most consumers multihome, that is when σ is low.
Another simplification that appears when buyers' quasi-demand is linear is that the ratio of total elasticity to own-brand elasticity is equal to the single homing index σ: This property implies that the price structure under platform competition (between for-profits or between associations) is the same as under a monopoly platform:
Consider for example a decrease in ∆. As the platforms become more substitutable, buyer multihoming increases (σ falls); this induces platforms to steer, resulting in low prices on the seller side. However, competition also becomes more intense on the buyer side, resulting in lower buyer prices (p B falls) and thereby in a higher opportunity cost (c − p B ) of servicing sellers. For linear demand on the buyer side, these two effects offset. Last, let us compare the common price structure with that of the Ramsey optimum. A useful property of linear demands is that the revenue (price times quantity) is equal to twice the product of the net surplus and the elasticity of demand. This property implies that if seller's quasi-demand is linear as well, (7) is equivalent to (5) , and so the common price structure is Ramsey optimal. (b) Second-order conditions. In the Hotelling model: 
Therefore the second-order condition is satisfied whenever the Hessian determinant of π i is nonnegative: The second-order condition is always satisfied in the second region, since β 2 = −α > 0 so that H = 3α 2 > 0. In the first region, it is easy to see that β 1 + 4α is always negative. Thus the second-order condition is satisfied if and only if β 1 ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
When this condition is not satisfied, there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. The only candidate equilibrium (p B , p S ) can be destabilized by a "double-deviation", where one of the platforms (say platform 1) increases p B 1 by ε and simultaneously decreases p S 1 by the same amount. The first order increase in profit is zero (as guaranteed by the first-order conditions) but the second-order increase is positive:
The study of second-order conditions under platform competition is complex in general. We content ourselves with the case of linear demand on both sides. So let us we assume that the sellers' quasi-demand is also linear:
The volume on platform 1 when p S 1 ≤ p S 2 is:
When p S 1 > p S 2 , the expression is simpler:
In Proposition 2 we have shown that a symmetric equilibrium between competing associations must satisfy condition (22):
Using formulae (25), (26) and (27) and after simplifications, this condition becomes:
Recall that this condition is necessarily satisfied in a symmetric equilibrium between competing platforms, independently of their governance structure. However the value of the total price is different: 
for associations, and , there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Starting from the price vectors given in formula (31), a proprietary platform can obtain a (second order) increase in volume (and thus profit) by a "double deviation": a small increase of p B 1 combined with a small decrease of p S 1 (while maintaining the total price constant). The same is true for associations, at the price vectors given in formula (32).
